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Ho: Business Trusts in China

BUSINESS TRUSTS IN CHINA: A REALITY CHECK
Lusina Ho*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, China took the bold step of enacting the Trust Law.1 It is
remarkable for a communist country to adopt a legal institution that was
originally created to preserve wealth for the landed gentry in England.2 It
is even more extraordinary that the business trust was promoted by the
Chinese government long before the (relatively simpler) family trust took
root. These facts make China’s enactment of the Trust Law provides an
interesting case study for how a socialist, civil-law jurisdiction with a
rudimentary private law system may put in place a sophisticated legal
concept that has taken the West centuries to develop.
Indeed, China had a lot of ground to cover in a short period of time.
The development of private law was not a high priority during the early
decades after the establishment of communist China.3 Accordingly, soon
after China adopted the Open Door Policy in 1979, it began enacting
specialist statutes on private law areas like contract,4 property,5 and
company law,6 to name but a few, in order to fill gaps in its private law
* Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, email: lusinaho@hku.hk. I am grateful to Ronald Fung,
Yongshan He, and Kenny Kwok for research assistance. The usual caveats apply.
1. Trust Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective
Oct.
1,
2001)
(China)
[hereinafter
“Chinese
Trust
Law”],
http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/China/Trust%20Law%20of%20People%27s%20Republic%20of
%20China.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WRR-RLDE].
2. Stephen Tensmeyer, Modernizing Chinese Trust Law, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 710, 712 (2015).
3. The General Principles of the Civil Law, which contained rudimentary provisions on
personhood, obligations and property, were only enacted in 1986. General Principles of the Civil Law
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987),
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_3343_0_7.html [https://perma.cc/T252-VCN8]; Albert Chen, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 29-30 (2019, 5th ed); J
Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. LAW 781, 782 (1989). It was only
in 2017 that China promulgated the General Provisions of Civil Law as the first step towards the enactment
of a comprehensive Civil Code: General Provisions of the Civil Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), CLI.1.291593(EN),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c12435/201703/7944f166a8194d788c63cc6610aebb4a.shtml (last visited
Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans. http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=291593
[https://perma.cc/5EF6-ESVC ].
4. Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999,
effective
Oct.
1,
1999)
(China),
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_2741_0_7.html
[https://perma.cc/UJ7M-JZV3].
5. Property Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective
Oct.
1,
2007)
(China),
http://english.www.gov.cn/services/investment/2014/08/23/content_281474982978047.htm
[https://perma.cc/WMB2-VAY7 ].
6. Company Law (Revised 2013) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
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system. As China interacted more with common law jurisdictions in
trade, finance, and investment, the influence of those common law
jurisdictions impacted Chinese law. The Chinese government’s adoption
of Trust Law is one example of this trend.
Soon after the enactment of the Trust Law, the Chinese enacted two
main administrative regulations to govern the licensing and operation of
trust companies and the collective-investor trusts (‘CIT’)—a form of
business trust that can only be operated by trust companies.7 The business
trust is championed as an instrument for funnelling private capital to
desirable investment targets that are crucial to the rapidly growing
economy.8 These legislative initiatives in trust law fuelled explosive
growth in the trust industry. The total assets managed by trust companies
skyrocketed from USD 39 million in 2003 to USD 3.27 trillion by March
2019, over 83,000 times its value in 2003.9 However, trust businesses in
China bears little resemblance to those in Western countries. Private
wealth management took up only 16% of the revenue of the Chinese trust
industry. The balance is split equally between single-investor trusts
(‘SIT’) and CITs, both of which are trusts in name only.10
SITs involve a single settlor and are typically used by commercial
banks in collaboration with trust companies to provide unofficial lending
in the shadow of the state credit system. CITs pool funds from investors
but promise them fixed rates of return over a set period of time,
irrespective of the value of the underlying assets. Many CIT products are
sold by state-owned banks, giving customers the appearance that they are
backed by a governmental guarantee. Therefore, CITs are trusts in name,
but in substance they are fixed income products often used to sidestep
regulatory constraints. This rendered the trillions of dollars invested in
Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html
[https://perma.cc/2Q3Z-C5HR].
7. Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Reg.
Comm’n (“CBRC”), Dec. 28, 2006, effective Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/200703/28/content_563583.htm
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=83c9e8177e31ca76bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/657N-P24X];
Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies’ Collective Trust Plans (promulgated by the CBRC,
Dec. 17, 2008, effective Feb. 4, 2009) (repealing the 2007 Measures by the same name) [hereinafter “CIT
Measures”], http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2009/content_1456086.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020),
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=122991 [https://perma.cc/MTB5VNXP].
8. Eric Linge, Trust as Institutions in China’s Financial Markets, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV.
283 (2011).
9. Main Business Data of Trust Companies at the End of the First Quarter of 2019, CHINA TR.
ASS’N
[hereinafter
Main
Business
Data],
http://www.xtxh.net/xtxh/statistics/45321.htm
[https://perma.cc/9L7Z-DR9L].
10. Torstein Ehlers, Steven Kong, & Feng Zhu, Mapping Shadow Banking in China: Structure
and Dynamics 16-17 (Bank for Int’l Settlements Working Paper No. 701, 2018),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work701.pdf [https://perma.cc/62G4-NH66].
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them extremely vulnerable to regulatory corrections.
Compounding the regulatory risks are the inadequacy of private law
remedies for breach of trust and the failure to utilise the judicial process
to enforce these remedies. The Trust Law was enacted in broad strokes
that leave many conceptual issues about the rights and remedies of the
beneficiaries unanswered.11 For example, the degree to which China
replicates the proprietary remedies that have made the trust such an
attractive institution in the common law world is unclear. These
uncertainties could have been resolved by the courts through the
adjudication of trust disputes, but unfortunately the regulators have been
too fast to intervene by administrative means.
In light of these challenges, this Article examines the unique
phenomenon of the Chinese business trust. It argues that a major reason
why proper business trusts have not yet taken root in China is her systemic
failure to appreciate and adhere to the core principles of trust law. This
systemic distortion is shared across private investors, trust companies,
and regulators. Regulatory tightening is only partially effective in guiding
the industry to legitimate trust business. The key to accomplishing this
goal lies in implementing the core principles of trust law in judicial
practice.
In what follows, Part 2 will outline the business trust as it was originally
conceived by the law drafters. Part 3 will compare this vision with the
reality of Chinese business trusts to show how the trust concept has been
systematically distorted and abused. It will also examine the partial
success of regulatory efforts to rein in such trusts. Part 4 will argue that
only when the core features of the trust have taken root in Chinese private
law would the trust industry be able to truly break away from its currently
problematic business model. To this end, the Article will identify what
these core problematic features are and then propose specific amendments
to the Trust Law to resolve these problems.
II. BUSINESS TRUSTS: THE VISION
The Chinese Trust Law was introduced in 2001 to tighten up the
supervision of trust and investment companies. These were non-bank
financial institutions that the Chinese government revived at national and
provincial levels after the adoption of the Open Door Policy. Their main
purpose was to obtain extra-budgetary investments to fund infrastructure
and development projects that burgeoned in China.12 However, their
11. See generally LUSINA HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA (2003); Lusina Ho, Rebecca Lee, & Jin
JinPing, Trust Law in China: A Critical Evaluation of its Conceptual Foundation, in TRUST LAW IN ASIAN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 80, 85-91 (Lusina Ho & Rebecca Lee eds., 2013).
12. See Vincent Pace, Comment: The Bankruptcy of the Zhu Kuan Group: A Case Study of Cross‐
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business model was limited, and was comprised primarily of so-called
“trust deposits.” Trust deposits were fixed deposits, or “trust loans,”
whereby these companies acted as agents between companies lending to
each other. There was no ring-fencing of funds that was fundamental to
a trust, nor was the investor’s investment returns, which were interests
paid on the deposits, linked to the performance of the underlying assets.
It was thought that the Trust Law could set forth the legal requirements
of a trust, and help guide these companies to develop proper trust
businesses.13
The drafters thus laid down a framework of “one law, two
regulations”14 for trust activities, whereby the Trust Law introduces the
essential features of the common law trust into China and the regulations
provide a legal footing for the operation of trust business. Crucially, the
Law affirms the axiom of the segregation of trust property from the
personal property of the trustee, and the principle that the trust property
includes all properties derived from the initial trust property, whether
lawfully or not.15 None of these notions were previously embraced in
China in relation to the trust.
The two core regulations aim at steering the trust industry towards
proper trust business and giving them a core competitiveness against other
financial institutions. They are: (1) the Measures for the Administration
of Trust Companies (“Trust Companies Measures”),16 which govern the
Border Insolvency Litigation against a Chinese State‐Owned Enterprise, 27 U. PA. J. INTʹL ECON. L.
517, 520-21 (2006).
13. Lusina Ho, Trust Law in China: History, Ambiguity and Beneficiary’s Rights, in REIMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 183, 188-89 (Lionel Smith ed., 2012).
14. This was reinforced in 2010 by the Measures for the Administration of Net Capital of Trust
Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, July 12, 2010, effective Aug.
24, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-09/10/content_1699764.htm [https://perma.cc/8CLD-DPMK],
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=8343&lib=law [https://perma.cc/WQD5-VBJV].
The Measures mandate internal risk control mechanisms in trust companies and a minimum ratio of 40
per cent net capital to net assets.
15. Chinese Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 14 & 15.
16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. There are other laws, regulations and guidelines that
pertain to the trust, such as Securities Investment Fund Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2003, rev’d Dec. 28, 2012, effective Apr. 24, 2015),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2015-07/03/content_1942864.htm
[https://perma.cc/S7U6ZZAF], unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=cd8acac44fc18cabbdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/M33G-YQ6T]; Measures for the Administration of Financial Asset Investment
Companies (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the China Banking and Ins. Reg. Comm’n
(“CBIRC”),
June
29,
2018,
effective,
June
29,
2018),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/2F17C2C95E724066818561C7D2F622D8.html
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=8f3f09dee23f2c64bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/337W-E33A];
Measures for the Administration of Wealth Management Subsidiary Companies of Commercial Banks
(promulgated by the China Banking and Ins. Reg. Comm’n, Dec. 2, 2018, effective Dec. 2, 2018),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/C441E44624394A76B25051CA7F4AFE5C.html
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
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licensing and operation of trust companies and place them under the
supervision of the former China Banking Regulatory Commission
(“CBRC”); and (2) the Measures for the Administration of Trust
Companies’ Collective Trust Plans (“CIT Measures”), which set out the
rules for operating CITs and give trust companies an exclusive licence to
operate them.17 They were regulated by the CBRC, which was merged in
April 2018 with the China Insurance Regulatory Commission to form the
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”).18
This regulatory framework puts in place three important measures to
carve out a special role for business trusts. First, CITs may invest across
an unrestricted range of markets in debt, equity, property and any other
means,19 a privilege not enjoyed by other financial instruments such as
securities investment funds or real estate investment trusts. Second, trust
companies have an exclusive licence to operate CITs. In granting trust
companies the privilege to operate the only cross-market investment
product in the financial market, the regulators have given them a core
competitiveness over other financial institutions. Third, to counteract the
higher investment risks that stem from this unique flexibility, CITs are
subject to strict conditions on the number of individual investors and the
threshold investment amount of each investor. For example, the
minimum investment by any investor in a CIT is CNY 1 million (about
USD 150,000). Individual investors in a CIT must pass an asset- or
income-based test.20 In any trust plan, there can only be at most 50
individual investors that invest less than CNY 3 million each. These
restrictions aim at confining CITs to high net-worth individuals and
institutional investors, who have a higher risk tolerance and are more

http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=17f5d34771cda0f4bdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/MP5ZZ9VV]; Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management Business of
Commercial Banks (promulgated by the China Banking and Ins. Reg. Comm’n, Sept. 26, 2018, effective
Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5350052.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2020), unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=4a42780a616a0fe3bdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/EK43-RYY8]; and Guidelines on Due Diligence of Trust Companies in Fiduciary
Duties (promulgated by the China Trustee Ass’n, Sept. 1, 2018, effective Dec. 31, 2018,
http://www.xtxh.net/xtxh/u/cms/www/201809/19095441wnkx.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial
trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=aba940dce2d97fa1bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/UL8AFASV].
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18. Zhongguo Yinhang Baoxian Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Zhengshi Guapai [The China Banking
and Insurance Regulatory Commission Officially Begins Operation], CHINA BANKING REGULATORY
COMM’N
(Apr.
9,
2018),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/EB7840D7EA7344CEBFAD044E5CDE33DA.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2020).
19. CIT Measures, supra note 7, art. 26.
20. Individual investors must either have at least CNY 1 million assets by themselves or with
family members, or an annual income of over CNY 200,000 by themselves or CNY 300,000 with their
spouses in the three years prior to the investment.
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sophisticated investors.21 While CITs are privately placed investment
trusts that pool funds from two or more investors, SITs serve single, largescale investors who are typically financial institutions.
The light regulation of CITs and trust companies are designed to
encourage the development of innovative and tailor-made investment
structures for sophisticated investors. In the years following the
enactment of the regulations, the CBRC through continuous notices
provided guidance to trust companies on the operational models of
innovative investment trusts.22 It sought to assign trust companies the de
facto role of domestic private investment banks, which have yet to appear
in China. This is due, in one part, to the heavy regulatory constrains
placed on state commercial banks to provide such financial services, and,
in another part, to the underdevelopment of debt equity markets in China.
High hopes are thus placed on trust companies to channel capital to those
segments of the economy that are cut off by this market vacuum, and the
business trust is a key instrument in this design.
III. THE REALITY: SYSTEMIC DISTORTION OF THE TRUST
The CIT has proven to be extremely popular. The percentage share of
industry assets held under such trusts rose from 13% in 2010 to 42% in
the first quarter of 2019, at a value of CNY 9.5 trillion (USD 1.3 trillion).23
But a closer examination reveals a reality that is in sharp contrast to their
intended function. Trust companies manage CITs no differently as banks
would with fixed deposit instruments, pocketing profits they made from
the underlying investment after paying the promised rate of return to
21. The CBRC has indicated its intention to issue the Measures for the Management of Capital
Trusts before the end of 2019. Yinjianbaohui: Zhengqu Niandiqian Tuichu Jijin Xintuo Guanli Banfa
[China Banking and Insurance Commission: Seeking to Promulgate the Measures for the Management of
Capital Trusts Before the End of the Year], SEC. DAILY (China) (Mar 1. 2019),
http://epaper.zqrb.cn/html/2019-03/01/content_413640.htm?div=-1
[https://perma.cc/W64R-SNNB].
The Measures will provide for public placement capital trusts with a significantly lower threshold
requirement of CNY 10,000 (about USD 1,500), which will be subject to the same, more stringent
regulatory requirements of other investment products such as securities investment funds.
22. Notice on Issuing the Guidelines for Trust Companies to Operate the Trust Private Equity
Investment Business (promulgated by the CBRC, June 25, 2008, effective June 25, 2008)
http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl474s509.txt (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans.
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=21222b478d90acc1bdfb&lib=law&EncodingName=big5
[https://perma.cc/3ZPT-EPV9]; Notice on the Relevant Issues Concerning Supporting the Innovation and
Development of Trust Companies (promulgated by the CBRC, Mar. 25, 2009, effective Mar. 25, 2009),
CLI.4.142650(EN)
(Lawinfochina),
unofficial
trans.
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8682&CGid= [https://perma.cc/BY7S-Q7HL],
article 10 of the 2009 Notice was revoked by paragraph 3 of the Notice on Strengthening the Supervision
of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies (promulgated by the CBRC, Feb. 5, 2010, effective
Feb. 10, 2010), unofficial trans. http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=2e35ce36e7d8efdfbdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/X6Y3-JMEF].
23. See Main Business Data, supra note 9.
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investors. Investors also treat trust products as high-yield bonds, and
expect trust companies or local authorities to bail out these trusts should
they default. The regulators, all too eager to avert any social instability
that may stem from trust defaults, intervene to tackle transgressions by
administrative intervention, thus suppressing the development of private
law remedies for breaches of trust. A closer look at each of these
problematic aspects is now in order.
A. Fixed Income Products
In actual practice, CITs are fixed income products and a far cry from
their ideal form as private placement trusts meant to be tailormade for
sophisticated investors. A significant proportion of them are initiated by
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and local government financing
vehicles as a financing platform. Trust companies, mostly controlled by
local governments, do not actively manage a diversified portfolio of
fluctuating assets under the trusts. Rather, fund investments take the form
of extending loans to the initiators in return for interest and serve the
purpose of financing the latter’s business projects or real estate and
infrastructure projects. The trust plans are for a set period of time, usually
one to two years, at a fixed return rate of some eight to nine percent, which
is much higher than the capped interest rates of bank deposits that do not
apply to trusts.
The structure of a typical CIT can be illustrated by a trust plan initiated
by SPIC Xianrong (Shanghai) Assets Management Co Ltd, an ultimate
subsidiary of one of the top five electricity generation companies in
China.24 In this plan, SPIC Xianrong issued a wealth management
product to provide financing for Rongjiang State-owned Assets
Management Co Ltd, the investment arm of the Rongjiang county in
Guizhou. Qualified investors subscribed to the wealth management
product at a minimum threshold of CNY 1 million. The pooled funds
were then used to subscribe to a CIT, which loaned the funds to Rongjiang
Assets Management to finance the county’s government projects to
relocate the poor for urbanization. The subscription was for a fixed period
of 2 years at 7.5% interest rate (or 7.9% for investors of a higher amount),
with interest payable bi-annually. The loans to the county’s asset
management company were secured, inter alia, by six plots of lands
owned by the county government in prime location in the city center. The
offering of government land as security was designed to instil investor
24. Diagram adapted from 2019 Chengtou Weiyuechao Laishi Xiongxiong [The Tidal Wave of
Defaults by City Investment Corporations], SINA FIN. (Jan. 19, 2019) (China),
https://finance.sina.cn/china/gncj/2019-01-19/detail-ihrfqziz9000688.d.html?vt=4&pos=17
[https://perma.cc/2HP6-XUWS].
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confidence. The plan can be seen in the following diagram.

In this arrangement, even though the borrower of the loan was an asset
management company, it was obvious that the main driver and architect
of the CIT was the government of the Rongjiang County. The trust
company’s role as trustee was purely passive. In this regard, it is very
telling that the sales information of the trust specifically mentioned, as a
point of attraction, the availability of “support of government
documents.” Since local governments are under strict prohibition from
running deficits to fund government projects, CITs allow them to obtain
non-standard financing for these purposes. In reality, they are high yield
government bonds that conceal the true extent of the fiscal deficit and run
a high risk of default because of the lack of a diversified investment
portfolio.25
B. Illusory Investor Protection
Apart from not operating CITs as genuine investment trusts, trust
companies also pay lip service to investor protection measures that are
applicable to such trusts. Article 6 of the CIT Measures imposes a
threshold investment amount of CNY 1 million from individual investors
and requires them to satisfy an asset- or income-based test. Articles 7 and
8 stipulate prudence measures such as mandatory risk disclosure,
disclosure of the professional qualification of trust company personnel,
and prohibition on misleading statements. Yet, Article 8(3) also allows
trust companies to delegate the distribution of trust plans to other financial
institutions, but unfortunately does not stipulate any duty of supervision
on the part of the trust companies or liability for the distributor’s
25. Id.
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wrongdoing.
As trust companies do not yet have any established client base of their
own, they typically delegate the distribution of trust plans to commercial
banks owned by local governments. In fact, a majority of the plans are
sold by third-party intermediaries that are not financial institutions. This
is problematic for several reasons. First, these institutions are loosely
regulated and ill-equipped to distribute high-risk investment products to
their client base of small investors. Second, since Articles 7 and 8 only
apply to trust companies, these provisions are easily bypassed once
distribution is delegated to another institution. Third, trust companies
also delegate the screening of qualified investors to intermediaries
without monitoring compliance with the regulation. Worse still, to boost
their business volume, it is not uncommon for the intermediaries to split
the minimum subscription of CNY 1 million into smaller units, thus
defeating the original design of confining CITs to sophisticated investors
who are better placed to absorb investment losses than small investors.26
Fourth, since the intermediaries charge fees, it is not in their interest to
make full disclosure of the risk rating of the products; in fact, they often
encourage investors’ assumption that the local governments will bail out
the plans at default. There is thus very little investor awareness of the
risky nature of the trust plans, let alone the fact that the high interest rates
are precisely because the underlying borrowers cannot obtain credit from
state banks.
Regulatory response is slow and piecemeal. It was not until 2014 that
the matter was addressed in the sub-provisions of the Notice on Improving
the Organizational Management System of Banks’ Wealth Management
Business27 and the Guiding Opinions on the Risk Supervision of Trust
Companies of 2014.28 Article 4 of the Notice prescribes prudential
measures on the sale of wealth management products by banks, including
making clear statements in sales brochures that “wealth management
products are not deposits, and are subject to investment risks.” Article 2
of the Guiding Opinions affirms the need for strict adherence with the CIT
Measures, namely the requirements on private placement, qualified

26. Hsu Mou yu Wang Mou Hezuo Hetong Jiufen An (许某与王某合作合同纠纷案)[A Case
Concerning the Dispute over the Cooperation Contract between Hsu and Wang], Beijing Yizhong Min
Zhong Civil Case No. 7332, (July 12, 2012) (China).
27. Notice on Issues Concerning Improving the Organizational Management System of Banks'
Wealth Management Business (promulgated by the CBRC, July 10, 2014, effective July 10, 2014), art. 4,
para. 1, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2014/content_2781483.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020),
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=229217&lib=law [https://perma.cc/T9SU9XEU].
28. Guiding Opinions on Regulation of Risk Supervision of Trust Companies (promulgated by the
CBRC, Apr. 8, 2014, effective Apr. 8, 2014), art. 2, para. 2, unofficial trans.,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=22196&lib=law [https://perma.cc/4VGB-L99W].
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investors, as well as risk and information disclosure, so as to prevent
intermediaries from transferring sales risks to trust companies. But just
as the original CIT Measures were largely ignored, there is little evidence
that the subsequent instruments have been heeded.
A further attempt to improve investor protection was made in the
Administrative Measures for Trust Registration of 2017,29 which sought
to launch the long-awaited system for trust registration mentioned in
Article 10 of the Trust Law of 2001. The Measures provide for
registration of trust products and the beneficial rights held under them.
This involves pre-registration of a trust product five working days prior
to its issuance, and initial registration within ten working days of
establishment.30 Apart from basic information about the trust product, the
trust company must also disclose the source of trust property, trust
property management plan, transaction structure, risk warning statements,
risk-control measures, and information on off-site promotion.31 It is
noteworthy that beneficiaries are allowed to open a trust beneficial right
account to record their beneficial rights and changes to these rights with
the trust registration corporation.32 Beneficial right registration is by the
real name of the beneficiary, such that the rights, if any, of sub-owners of
investment units in CITs will not be registered. To track changes to
beneficial rights, the Measures mandate further registration of trust
variation and termination, as well as correction of inaccurate information
in the registry.33
Most recently, in September 2018, the China Trustee Association
issued Guidelines on the Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust
Companies, which provide that in marketing trust products, trust
companies shall conduct knowing-your-client procedures to match
clients’ risk assumption capabilities with their investments, and prepare
marketing information themselves for distribution by sale
intermediaries.34
These guidelines affirm the regulator’s commitment to steering trust
business to its originally intended scope, but still fall short of providing
concrete directions to achieve this goal. For example, the Measures for
Trust Registration does not guarantee compliance of trust products with
the regulations, nor the continuous validity of registered information
29. Notice on Printing and Distributing Administrative Measures for Trust Registration
(promulgated
by
the
CBRC,
Aug.
25,
2017,
effective
Sept.
9,
2017)
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5254334.htm [https://perma.cc/5TJY-PHFV].
30. Id. at arts. 10-11.
31. Id. at art. 10(1).
32. Id. at arts. 22-29.
33. Id. at arts. 12-15.
34. Guidelines on Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust Companies, supra note 16, arts. 13
& 17.
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about the investment value and risks of trust products.35 Besides,
registration of beneficial ownership is voluntary.36 Moreover, the
Measures provide for registration of trust products but not trust property
itself, and leave open the question as to whether the former is deemed to
include registration of trust property. In a civil law jurisdiction such as
China, registration of trust property is crucial to the enforceability of the
beneficiary’s right against third parties. Before these questions are
resolved, the utility of the Measures lies only in providing a public
repository of information on trust products. They have achieved very
little in enhancing the protection of investors’ beneficiary rights.
Second, it is ironic that when detailed provisions on investor protection
were finally issued, they were promulgated in much weaker form as
industry guidelines issued by the China Trustee Association. In any
event, the tightening of investor protection rules will only achieve partial
success in developing proper trust practice in China. In so far as CITs
continue to provide fixed return rates not based on the periodic
performance of the underlying asset, investors will treat them no
differently from high-yield bonds. In fact, a more serious problem is that
Chinese investors assume that there will be implicit guarantees of such
returns.
C. Implicit Guarantee
1.

The emergence and prevalence of implicit guarantee

A fundamental principle of trust law is that profits and losses arising
from the use of trust property are attributable to the beneficiary.
Specifically, in the absence of any breach of duty by the trustee,
investment losses are borne by the beneficiary. This principle stems from
the notion of trust property as a segregated and fluctuating fund held by
the trustee on behalf of the beneficiary. Yet the Trust Law does not
expressly provide for this principle, and stops short at merely stipulating
the segregation of the trust fund.37 Furthermore, Article 34 of the Trust
Companies Measures and Article 8(1) of the CIT Measures only focus on
prohibiting trust companies from guaranteeing any minimum return or
promising the absence of investment loss. The principle is indirectly dealt
with in the provisions of the CIT Measures pertaining to disclosure of
risks to investors. Articles 11(3) and 14 of the CIT Measures respectively
provide that statements of subscription risks and trust contracts should

35. Administrative Measures for Trust Registration, supra note 29, art. 19.
36. Id. at art. 22.
37. Id. at art. 16.
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declare that risks arising from authorised trust activities shall be borne by
the trust property.
In reality, however, CIT contracts stipulate fixed rates of return
irrespective of the performance of the underlying asset. Furthermore,
investors expect eventual government rescue of the trust plan by way of
so called ‘rigid payment’ (gangxing duifu). This phrase was coined to
mean that when a plan defaults on maturity, the trust company or even the
local government—who is technically not the borrower—will make
partial or full payment from their own assets or other sources of funding.
While trust companies avoid making any express guarantee of repayment
or minimum return in the trust contract, the structure of CIT transactions
and past precedents of bailouts strongly suggest otherwise.
As to the structure of CIT transactions, the trust company and even the
borrower in a typical CIT are controlled by or related to the SOE or local
government that ultimately benefits from the loan. For example, in a
government-initiated CIT, the borrower is the financing vehicle of the
local government. The underlying loan is guaranteed by its associated
company or secured by government land, and the purpose of the loan is
to fund its real estate or infrastructure projects. Furthermore, the trust
plan may be sold by a state-owned commercial bank controlled by the
same government. All these features give the appearance that the trust is
backed by the local government, who provides an implicit guarantee, even
though they have no legal obligation to do so.
The prevalent practice of bailouts has also contributed to investors’
assumption of an implicit guarantee.38 Ironically, the first few instances
of out-of-court compensation were ordered by the regulators. Around
2005, a number of high-profile trusts defaulted on maturity. The
regulators intervened and ordered a repayment arrangement based on
expediency rather than principles of trust law. This was, essentially, an
executive-ordered settlement. For example, in the widely publicized case
of the Jinxin Trust,39 the trust plan collected over CNY 80 million from
38. For media and academic discussion of implicit guarantee, see David Keohane & Josh Noble,
For the “2010 China Credit / Credit Equals Gold #1 Collective Trust Product” Bugs Out There, FIN.
TIMES (London) (Jan. 17, 2014), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/01/17/1744832/for-the-2010-chinacredit-credit-equals-gold-1-collective-trust-product-bugs-out-there/
[https://perma.cc/QB52-69BW];
Deng Gang, Gangxing Duifu de Falv Zhili [Legal Control of Implicit Guarantee] 97(2) JINRONG FAYUAN
[FINANCIAL
LAW
FORUM]
205,
211
(2018),
https://www.finlaw.pku.edu.cn/jrfy/gk/2018_jrfy/jrfnzd97j/270913.htm, [https://perma.cc/76QH-RJ2M].
39. See Jinxin Yupin Xintuo Yinbao Xintuo Duifu Weiji [The Incident of Jinxin Trust Set Off Trust
Default Risks], SINA FIN. (China) (July 12, 2004), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-0712/10373679952.shtml [https://perma.cc/V4J5-UNS2]. This involves a CIT that had collected over CNY
80 million from investors for the purported merger and acquisition of two dairy companies, in return for
a fixed return of 5% at the end of the trust period upon the exercise of a repurchase option of the shares
of the target companies. Six months after the issuance of the trust, the companies went into financial
difficulties, and it transpired that the trust had not acquired any share ownership in these companies.
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investors for the purported merger and acquisition of two dairy
companies. In return, investors received a fixed return of five percent at
the end of the trust period upon the exercise of a repurchase option of the
shares of the target companies. Six months after the issuance of the trust,
when the dairy companies encountered financial difficulties, the trust
funds were unlawfully transferred to the dairy companies without any
allocation of shares in favor of the trust. The trust company was ordered
to repay small investors CNY 100,000 or less the full amount of their
principal, and to repay those who invested more than CNY 100,000 90%
of their principal. Senior employees of the trust company were convicted
of the crime of illegal absorption of public savings. Over time, with
repeated instances of bailouts, these aberrations have become the norm.40
Trust companies even formalize this practice by so-called “drawer
agreements,” in which they enter into shadow contracts—outside of the
trust contract—to pay liquidated damages very much at the level of a
guarantee of return.41
2.

Causes and Implications

Several factors contributed to this peculiar phenomenon.42 First,
ignorance of trust law and the economic reality of such trusts as fixedterm loans to government-related entities encouraged investors’
assumption that the authorities would eventually come to their rescue.
The investors of the Jinxin Trust, for example, organized demonstrations
in front of the branch office of Shanghai Communications Bank, through
which they bought the trust product, to put pressure on the government to
provide a bailout.
Second, concerns about political stability motivated regulators and
local governments to exert political pressure on trust companies to do so.
In a 2004 circular to trust companies, the CBRC stated that defaults of

40. A few examples of high profile bailouts are: Zhengzhi Jinkai No. 1 Trust Plan of Zhongcheng
Xintuo Co Ltd in 2014 (CNY 3 billion plan with promised return at 9.5%-11% to acquire shares of coal
mining enterprises; on default, investors were given the option to have the principal restored without
interest, or obtain shares in the underlying enterprise); Jixin-Songhuajiang No. 77 Trust Plan of Jilin Trust
Co Ltd in 2014 (CNY 970 million invested in coal mining); Xinhua Xintuo-Shanghai Lvren Trust Plan of
Xinhua Trust Co Ltd in 2014 (CNY 850 million at 9.8%-12% return rate, invested in real estate
corporation), discussed in Zhongguo Xintuo Ye Xianru Duifu Weiji [Chinese Trust Industry in Default
Crisis], JRJ.COM, http://trust.jrj.com.cn/focus/trustcri/ [https://perma.cc/JQ4X-2QT3].
41. See, e.g., Wangmou Su Shanghai Mou Zichan Guanli Youxian Gongsi Weituo Licai Hetong
Jiufen An (王某诉上海某资产管理有限公司委托理财合同纠纷案) [A Case Concerning Entrusted
Wealth Management Contract between Wang and A Shanghai Asset Management Ltd Co] (2012)
Shanghai Minhang Min Si (Shang) Chu Civil Case No. 4, Mar. 15, 2012 (China).
42. See Li Jiang Jun & Fan Wen Xiang, Jinrong Licai Chanpin Gangxing Duifu Kunju de
Chengyin Jiqi Huajie [Problems and Resolutions of the Rigid Payment Dilemma of Wealth Management
Products] 11 XIANDAI JINGJI TANTAO [MODERN ECON. RESEARCH] 44-48 (2014).
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CITs must be reported to their local branch, which would immediately
suspend the trust company from issuing new collective trusts.43 To avert
such a drastic sanction and the disruption of business, trust companies
were left with no feasible alternative but to bail out such plans.
Third, trust companies were also eager to protect their commercial
reputation and maintain the client base that they had expended
tremendous efforts to build. As investor expectation of compensatory
payment built up, they bailed plans out even in the absence of orders from
the CBRC.
Fourth, and ironically, trust companies often fund the bailouts by
infringing beneficiaries’ rights. For example, the lack of enforcement and
proper trust accounting standards allow them to retain any balance of
profits that may remain after meeting the fixed rate of return promised to
the investors. Yet this amounts to a clear breach of the no-profit rule that
is set out in the Trust Law and the CIT Measures. 44 Trust companies also,
through rolling the issuance of funds and aggregating fund management,
mix the funds of trusts with different maturity periods into a commingled
pool without separate accounting, and pay bailouts from pooled assets.45
This, in effect, misappropriates funds from other trust plans and diverts
them to unprofitable plans. Alternatively, the trust companies roll over
investors’ rights from unprofitable plans to new one, and in doing so blur
the line between CITs and Ponzi schemes.46
The implications of implicit guarantee for the financial market are farreaching.47 The perception of guaranteed profitability disincentivizes
43. Notice on Further Regulating Collective Trust Schemes (promulgated by the CBRC, Dec. 7,
2004,
effective
Dec.
7,
2004),
art.
18,
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/1077.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
44. Article 26 of the Chinese Trust Law provides that except obtaining remuneration according to
the provisions of this Law, the trustee may not seek interests for himself by using the trust property; Article
26 of the CIT Measures also provides that: application of the trust funds by the trust company shall be
consistent with the investment direction and strategies agreed upon in the documents of the Trust Scheme.
45. Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Jinrong Wending Fenxi Xiaozhu [FIN. STABILITY ANALYSIS
GROUP, PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA], CHINA FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 120 (2017),
https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-07/06/5208092/files/572fec1a7b41440295c62fe548ad56fd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K48F-FHLU].
46. Zhang Minjie, Woguo Jihe Zijin Xintuo Jihua Touzizhe Quanyi Baohu zhi Guankui [Protection
of Investors in Chinese Collective Capital Trust Schemes] 27(5) YANJIUSHENG FAXUE [GRADUATE LAW
REVIEW]
78,
79
(2018),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFD2012&filenam
e=CUPL201205008&v=MjYzMTkxRnJDVVI3cWZaT2RtRnl6a1VyekpKampiWXJHNEg5UE1xbzlG
YklSOGVYMUx1eFlTN0RoMVQzcVRyV00= [https://perma.cc/NZN4-LYXG].
47. Dan Awrey, Law and Finance in the Chinese Shadow Banking System, 48(1) CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 1, 42-43 (2015); see also Guo Wei, Jinrong Jigou Baodi Licai de Hefaxing Miju uu Kunjing [The
Legality and Dilemma of Implicit Guarantee by Financial Institutions] 43(5) BEIJING DAXUE XUEBAO
[JOURNAL
OF
PEKING
UNIVERSITY]
111
(2006),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFD2006&filenam
e=BDZK200605015&v=MTk5NzJGeXprVUx6Skp5blJaYkc0SHRmTXFvOUVZWVI4ZVgxTHV4W
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investors from rigorous risk assessment and encourages underlying
borrowers to compete purely by offering higher, often unrealistic interest
rates. Trust companies also have little incentive to scrutinize aggressive
borrowers, as a higher interest rate gives them a wider margin for personal
profits. As a result, the practice shields low-grade debts and disrupts the
flow of capital to truly competitive economic activities. It also transfers
the risks of unprofitable investments to financial institutions and creates
a time bomb that ticks in the shadow of the financial market.48
3.

Regulatory control

In 2014, CBRC issued the Notice on Issues Concerning Improving the
Organizational Management System of Banks’ Wealth Management
Business to urge banks not to undertake guaranteed payment, which had
limited effect on prevalent practice.49 Regulatory intervention finally
came in April 2018, when the central bank and three regulatory bodies
jointly issued the Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Asset Management
Business of Financial Institutions (“Asset Management Opinions”).50
The Opinions adopt two strategies. First, they provide a non-exhaustive
list of situations that are deemed to provide implicit guarantee and are
hence prohibited under Article 2(2). These include: (1) direct guarantees
of the principal or returns for a product; (2) transfers of the rights of
different investor groups by means such as a rollover in order to provide
such guarantee; and (3) direct payments by the issuer or manager of an
investment product on default, whether through raising funds on its own
or commissioning another institution to do so.51 This inclusive definition
closes the loophole left by the Trust Companies Measures and Trust Plans
Measures, which only proscribes the express undertaking of guaranteed
returns in trust contracts.
Second, a series of prudential measures aimed at preventing out-ofVM3RGgxVDNxVHJXTTFGckNVUjdxZlpPZG0= [https://perma.cc/W4Y7-G6CN].
48. See Ning Zhu, CHINA'S GUARANTEED BUBBLE: HOW IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT HAS
PROPELLED CHINA'S ECONOMY WHILE CREATING SYSTEMIC RISK, Ch. 11 (McGraw-Hill Education, 2016).
49. See supra note 27. For a thorough critique, see Pu Zhengxing, Ziguan Xingui de Yaodian
Fenxi yu Yingxiang Qianzhan [Analysis of the Key Points and Effects of the New Asset Management Rules]
502
NANFANG
JINRONG
[SOUTH
CHINA
FINANCE]
66
(2018),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&f
ilename=GDJR201806010&v=MjI4MjIxTHV4WVM3RGgxVDNxVHJXTTFGckNVUjdxZlpPZG1Ge
XprVnIvQklpbkJmTEc0SDluTXFZOUVaSVI4ZVg= [https://perma.cc/DZ7R-KLTL].
50. Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Asset Management Business of Financial Institutions
(promulgated by the People’s Bank of China, China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, & the State Admin. of Foreign
Exchange, Apr. 27, 2018, effective Apr. 27, 2018) [hereafter Asset Management Opinions], unofficial
trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=ff2037951095d290bdfb&lib=law [https://perma.cc/J9XF8DAD].
51. Id. at art. 19.
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court payments are reiterated. For example, the assets of a trust product
must be held by a custodian separately from the trustee.52 There must be
separate accounting and segregation of funds, and the pooling of cash for
rolling issuance and aggregate operation is prohibited.53 To reduce
leverage levels, investors’ risk tolerance level and the risk rating of the
invested assets must be matched.54 Additionally, financial institutions are
required to create a risk reserve from ten percent of the management fees
to meet legal liability arising from its own breaches of duties.55
Importantly, Article 18 of the Opinions mandates the management of trust
assets on the basis of their net value, so that the value of the trust product
directly reflects the value of its underlying assets. To facilitate the
calculation of the net value of trust assets, the article requires proper
accounting and auditing of accounts in accordance with national
standards, and submission of audit reports to the regulatory authority.
While this is standard practice in Western markets, and should have been
adopted along with the reception of the trust in 2001, it has yet to take
root in China.
The Asset Management Opinions were supplemented by a series of
Measures and Notices.56 The impact of these drastic measures is palpable.
Since mid-2018, there have been media reports of defaults of over 100
trust plans, some of which even involve trust products backed by the
provincial governments of Tianjin and Guizhou.57 Even though this latest
52. Id. at art. 14.
53. Id. at art. 15.
54. Id. at art. 16.
55. Id. at art. 17.
56. Notice on Commencing the Work on “Consolidating Achievements in Irregularity
Rectification and Promoting Compliance Building” (promulgated by the China Banking and Insur.
Regulatory Comm’n, May 8, 2019, effective May 8, 2019), art. 11, sec. IV, Annex 1,
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-05/17/content_5392623.htm (last visited March 19, 2020), unofficial
trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=660b9d9a1b0a235abdfb&lib=law. See also, in relation to
other financial institutions, Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth Management
Business of Commercial Banks, supra note 15; Measures for the Administration of Wealth Management
Subsidiary Companies of Commercial Banks, supra note 15, arts. 31 & 55; Provisions on the
Administration of Operation of Privately Offered Asset Management Plans of Securities and Futures
Business Institutions (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Oct. 22, 2018, effective Oct.
22, 2018), art. 31, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201810/P020181022809298932631.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=29332&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/F58A-624W]; Measures for the Administration of the Privately Offered Asset
Management Business of Securities and Futures Business Institutions (promulgated by the China Sec.
Regulatory
Comm’n,
Oct.
22,
2018,
effective
Oct.
22,
2018),
art.
4,
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201810/P020181022804792210933.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2020), unofficial trans., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=3d62931e3f373daabdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/68CZ-3QD8].
57. Don Weinland and Sherry Fei Ju, Public Default at Chinese Trust Company Highlights Cracks
in Market, FIN. TIMES (London) (June 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/11a89df6-9720-11e9-8cfb30c211dcd229 (last visited Mar. 19, 2020); Liang Hong & Denise Jia, Anxin Trust Delays $405 Million
Payment
to
1,000
Investors,
CAIXIN
GLOBAL
(China)
(May
22,
2019),
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round of regulatory crackdown appears effective, regulation cannot, and
should not, replace the long overdue development of private law remedies
which have thus far been side-lined.58 This is because the regulatory
approach is liable to the influences of political and commercial
considerations, as is borne out in the development of shadow banking in
China.
D. Shadow Banking
1.

The abuse of the trust

Contrary to CITs, SITs are established by single investors. They are
typically used in a similar way as special purpose vehicles found in
Western jurisdictions.
Because of China’s unique regulatory
environment, only the trust license can invest in different financial
markets. This allows trust companies to leverage on the regulatory
privilege to provide “channelling service” for other institutions that are
restricted from making such investments. Ironically, the channelling
business that the Chinese government now seeks to curb grew out of
China’s CNY 4 trillion (USD 56.7 billion) stimulus package in 2009 to
counteract the global financial crisis. Through a number of notices,
CBRC allowed banks to issue wealth management products that pooled
funds from customers for investment in trusts managed by trust
companies.59 It did urge trust companies to actively manage the
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-05-22/anxin-trust-delays-405-million-payment-to-1000-investors101418350.html [https://perma.cc/7UDH-LWRA]; Xie Yu, Tianjin Government-backed Property Firm
May Default as China’s Deleveraging Campaign Reaches State-owned Sector, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (May 14, 2018) (Hong Kong), https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2146070/tianjingovernment-backed-property-firm-may-default-chinas (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
58. Liu Yan, Daziguan Shangweifa Zhi Jiuwen [Study on the Asset Management Opinions as
Higher-Level Law] 4 QINGHUA JINRONG PINGLUN [QINGHUA FINANCIAL REVIEW] 25 (2018),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&f
ilename=JRQH201804010&v=MTI3ODF6L2Fackc0SDluTXE0OUVaSVI4ZVgxTHV4WVM3RGgxV
DNxVHJXTTFGckNVUjdxZlpPZG1GeXptVTc3T0w= [https://perma.cc/5RZT-ZBQV].
59. Notice on Issuing the Guidelines on the Business Cooperation between Banks and Trust
Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 4, 2008, effective Dec. 4,
2008),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/20081222D75C0AA1792B5FBBFFC19BF
9CCDB9000.html
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7263&CGid= [https://perma.cc/PPG6-CH85]);
Notice on the Relevant Matters concerning the Cooperation between Banks and Trust Companies
(promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 14, 2004, effective Dec. 14, 2004),
unofficial
trans.,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8109&CGid=
[https://perma.cc/29W8-TVF7]; Notice on Regulating Relevant Matters on Wealth Management
Cooperation between Banks and Trust Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory
Comm’n,
Aug.
5,
2010,
effective
Aug.
5,
2010),
unofficial
trans.,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=136288&lib=law [https://perma.cc/DNR4-3B2R].
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investments in these trusts, and not merely serve as a channel for the
banks,60 albeit very few paid credence to the request. At its height in mid2010, 84% of business trusts in China were SITs; their percentage share
of the trust market declined gradually, along with the tightening of
regulation, to 42% in the first quarter of 2019.61
Channelling business has become the heart of shadow banking in
China, where the trust is not so much misunderstood but rather is misused
for the purposes of regulatory arbitrage. It is beyond the scope of the
present Article to explore this vast subject, which also affects other
financial institutions.62 Instead, this Article focuses on the use of the
business trust in shadow banking, the most prominent example of which
is the bank-trust cooperation. Banks use the SIT to conceal risky
corporate loans off their balance sheets in order to bypass their loan-todeposit ratio and to invest in prohibited industries fenced out of the state
credit system. This is achieved by nesting the SIT in multiple layers of
coordinated loans. For example, instead of lending directly to the target
corporate borrower, the bank lends to an intermediate bank which has
capacity under its loan-to-deposit ratio to make corporate loans. The
intermediate bank loans the same amount to an intermediate company,63
which then subscribes to an SIT that makes the loan to the target
borrower. The intermediate company, which is the beneficiary of the SIT,
then assigns its beneficial right back through the chain of transactions to
the original lending bank. This nesting of layers allows the debt to be
booked as an interbank loan, for which less capital needs to be set aside
because they are considered less risky. The original bank also books the
trust beneficial interest on its balance sheet. Bank-trust cooperation may
also take a simpler, alternative structure, which is neatly illustrated by a
recent decision publicized by the Chinese Supreme Court. In Shenzen
City Xili Baoen Fudi Graveyard Co. Ltd. v. Everbright Xinglong Trust
Co. Ltd. and in Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment
Co. Ltd. v. Everbright Xinglong Trust Co. Ltd.,64 Baoshang Bank
60. Notice on Regulating Relevant Matters on Wealth Management Cooperation between Banks
and Trust Companies (promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Jan. 13, 2011, effective
Jan. 13, 2011), art. 2, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-01/20/content_1789471.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=11524
[https://perma.cc/4TPB-LF33].
61. See Main Business Data, supra note 9.
62. See generally SHEN WEI, SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA: RISKS, REGULATIONS AND POLICY
(2016); Steven L. Schwarcz, Shadow Banking and Regulation in China and Other Developing Countries,
DUKE LAW SCH. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3694 (last visited
Mar. 19, 2020).
63. Banks are not allowed to lend directly to trust companies, hence the interposition of an
intermediate corporate borrower.
64. Ziguan Xingui Shenzhenshi Xili Baoen Fudi Muyuan Youxiang Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong
Xintuo
Youxian
Zeren
Gongsi
Jiekuan
Hetong
Jiufen
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established an SIT with the defendant trust company to extend a loan to
the appellants to bypass the bank lending rate of 6%.65 The interest rate
for the loan was 11.8%, and the interest payable on default was as high as
17.7%, giving Baoshang Bank close to double the profit margin it obtains
from the official lending rate.
Furthermore, insurance companies that are eager to boost profits also
use the trust to skirt regulatory restriction on investment in the stock
market and on permitted types of investments. In fact, they have emerged
as a major lender for cash-strapped property developers and local
governments, as the long maturity period of loans for construction and
infrastructure projects matches the long-term liabilities of insurance
companies. Often the loans are arranged directly with the borrower and
the trust company only provides channelling service with no active duty
in managing the underlying trust assets, let alone controlling their risks.
These opaque and multi-layered loan structures make it difficult for the
regulators to assess the actual risks borne by the chain of companies
involved. The spread of shadow banking from banks to other institutions
also means that hidden credit risks in China are much larger than current
financial data suggest, and a small vulnerability may cause a systemic
shock.
2.

Paradigm shift in regulatory policy

In 2013, the Chinese government began its efforts to regulate shadow
banking. In the first four years, it took a measured approach that did not
prohibit channelling business per se, but only its (mis)use to circumvent
regulation. As these efforts proved ineffective, there was a paradigm shift
in regulatory policy in 2017 to: (1) prohibit such business outright; (2)
assume centralized, cross-market oversight of financial institutions; and
(3) adopt standardized regulation based on products rather than the
institutions that operate them. The latter two measures aim at closing
loopholes that make regulatory arbitrage possible.
These regulatory efforts can be traced back to 2013, when the State
Council issued an internal document, the Notice on Issues Concerning
(资管新规深圳市西丽报恩福地墓园有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷)
[A
Loan Contract Dispute between Shenzen City Xili Baoen Fudi Graveyard Co Ltd and Everbright Xinglong
Trust Co Ltd] (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 393, June 29, 2018 (China); Ziguan Xingui Beijing Beida
Gaokeji Chanye Touzi Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong Xintuo Youxian Zeren Gongsi Jiekuan Hetong
Jiufen(资管新规北京北大高科技产业投资有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷)
[A Loan Contract Dispute between Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment Co Ltd and
Everbright Xinglong Trust Co Ltd (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 401, June 29, 2018 (China) (‘Everbright
Xinglong Trust Cases’). The two cases were heard together.
65. The figures are based on the facts of Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment
Co Ltd v. Everbright Xinglong Trust Co Ltd, id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6

786

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking (the “Notice”).66 The
Notice sought to strike a balance between risk prevention and financial
innovation, and paved the way for a spate of concrete regulatory
measures. In 2014, the CBRC issued the Guiding Opinions on the Risk
Supervision of Trust Companies,67 and the Guidelines for the
Consolidated Management and Supervision of Commercial Banks (2014
Revision),68 the latter of which was the first time the regulator defined
channelling business.69 These instruments do not prohibit bank-trust
cooperation per se, but urge trust companies not to help other institutions
bypass regulation. The purposes of these Guidelines are threefold: (1) to
stipulate unequivocally that the risks of channelled investments are borne
by the originating banks; (2) to require banks to disclose the risk
allocation in written contracts; and (3) to bring these investments on to
the balance sheets and capital adequacy requirements of these banks. The
China Insurance Regulatory Commission also issued a similar notice for
insurance companies, albeit it prescribed more stringent requirements on
the type and credit rating of the underlying assets.70
Yet the overheating of the economy continued unabated, prompting the
latest tide of regulation that involves a paradigm shift in policy. This
began with the CBRC announcement in March 2017 to rectify the so
called “three infringements, three self-profiteering, four incorrectness,
and ten chaos,” which was followed up by a spate of on-sight inspections
and instructions for financial institutions to investigate and report their
own infringing activities. This was followed by a surge in the number
and amount of administrative penalties at over 10 times that of the amount
ordered in the previous year. The high-handed approach continues to
date, and was affirmed by the CBRC as effective in curbing shadowbanking, which has, according to official data, fallen by 21% in 2018 as
71
compared to the previous year. The percentage share of SITs in the trust

66. Notice on Issues Concerning Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking (promulgated
by the Gen. Office of the St. Council, Dec. 31, 2013, effective Dec. 31, 2013), unofficial trans.,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=013f924f0d4a849abdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/L6YA9GCQ].
67. See supra note 28.
68. (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Dec. 30, 2014, effective Jul. 1, 2015),
unofficial trans., http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=241371&lib=law [https://perma.cc/D2YCN3MP].
69. Id. at art. 87.
70. Notice on Matters Concerning the Investments in Collective Fund Trust Plans with Insurance
Funds (promulgated by the China Ins. Reg. Comm’n, May 5, 2014, effective May 5, 2014),
http://bxjg.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab5225/info3914862.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2020), unofficial trans.,
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/7fe77ab909d869fabdfb.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
71. Statistics
available
from
CBRC,
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newShouDoc/8940ED1F6F7B4A4DB569D46764C9CBD8.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2020).
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market also dropped from 50% in the last quarter of 2016 to 42% in the
first quarter of 2019.72
Percentage share of assests held under single-investor
trusts (2010-19)
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Figure 1: Percentage share of assets held under SITs (2010-19)
These strong policy messages led to a series of regulatory instruments.
In December 2017, CBRC issued the Circular on Regulating Bank-Trust
Business (“Document 55”),73 which stipulated two new requirements
whilst reiterating previous regulatory themes: (1) commercial banks
should rigorously assess, select and monitor the quality of their
counterparties in bank-trust cooperation through a name-list system; and
(2) trust companies are strictly prohibited from accepting guarantees from
originating banks, entering into under-the-table agreements with banks,
providing channelling services to other institutions, and investing trust
funds in prohibited asset class such as real estate, local governments, the
stock market, or sectors with excess production capacity.
72. See supra note 9.
73. Notice on Regulating the Bank-Trust Business (promulgated by the China Banking Reg.
Comm’n, Nov. 22, 2017, effective Nov. 22, 2017),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/656ED8C75FA44F0387EF393B842A8A11
.html
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=27146&lib=law [https://perma.cc/DAJ9-4HSB]. Prior to
this Notice, there were: Notice on Special Inspection of Regulatory Arbitrage, Idle Arbitrage and Related
Arbitrage in the Banking Industry (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Mar. 28, 2017,
effective Mar. 28, 2017, http://www.waizi.org.cn/law/18867.html [https://perma.cc/QB7F-ATWW];
Notice on Carrying out the Special Campaign against “Inappropriate Innovations, Inappropriate
Transactions, Inappropriate Incentives, and Inappropriate Collections of Fees” in the Banking Industry
(promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Apr. 6, 2017, effective Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/ztzl/gbmjcbzc/yjh/201807/t20180704_1209906.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=23914&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/M6Q7-CWX4].
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Document 55 foreshadowed further concrete measures to combat
market irregularities. After a flurry of such measures74 came the Asset
Management Opinions of April 2018 (the “Opinions”),75 which
overhauled the previous approach to combating channelling business in
several ways. First, the Opinions centralized, cross-market regulation
through the establishment of the Financial Stability and Development
Committee under the State Council. Second, the Opinions involved the
standardization of regulation based on products rather than institutions to
minimize any room for channelling business to achieve regulatory
arbitrage. Third, the Opinions standardized the leverage ratio of all asset
management products and prohibited the launching of asset management
products (including trusts) to bypass regulation. Finally, the Opinions
limited such products to just one level of delegation to ensure
transparency of regulation.
The Opinions, originally set to take effect on June 30, 2019, have now
been postponed to December 31, 2020 to allow a longer transition period.
To guide trust companies to proper trust business, the CBRC has further
plans to issue Measures for the Management of Capital Trusts before the
end of 2019 to allow trust companies to operate public placement capital
trusts with a significantly lowered threshold of CNY 10,000, but subject
to more rigorous regulatory standards comparable to securities investment
funds.76 It is too early to tell whether these new measures are but another
cycle of the cat and mouse regulatory game, or the transformation of the
trust industry in keeping with its Western counterparts. However, as
Figure 1 shows, the percentage share of SITs managed by the trust
industry have indeed been on a steady decline, and will likely continue to
do so as existing SITs phase out upon maturity.
3.

Judicial activism

This hard-line approach has also found expression in recent judicial
practice. In Everbright Xinglong Trust Cases,77 the borrower argued that
74. Notice on Further Rectifying the Market Chaos in the Banking Industry (promulgated by the
China
Banking
Reg.
Comm’n,
Jan.
12,
2018,
effective
Jan.
12,
2018),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/84BF855655F54ECDA63CBBD0048F6C1
5.html
(last
visited
Mar.
19,
2020),
unofficial
trans.,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=0dfab0ebc9f53a7abdfb&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/RPG6MFUH]; see also Notice on Issues Concerning Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking, supra
note 66, Annex.
75. See Asset Management Opinions, supra note 50.
76. See SEC. DAILY, supra note 21.
77. Ziguan Xingui Shenzhenshi Xili Baoen Fudi Muyuan Youxiang Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong
Xintuo
Youxian
Zeren
Gongsi
Jiekuan
Hetong
Jiufen
(资管新规深圳市西丽报恩福地墓园有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷)
[A
Loan Contract Dispute between Shenzen City Xili Baoen Fudi Graveyard Co Ltd and Everbright Xinglong

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss3/6

22

Ho: Business Trusts in China

2020]

BUSINESS TRUSTS IN CHINA

789

the loan contract which allowed Baoshang Bank to bypass the bank
lending rate was an attempt to ‘conceal illegal goals under the disguise of
legitimate form and hence void under Article 52(3) of the Chinese
Contract Law. It understandably did not rely on the Asset Management
Opinions or any of the recent regulations because the 2011 loan contract
pre-dated them. However, in assessing this argument, the Chinese
Supreme Court cited the Opinions on its own initiative, and summarized
the regulatory prohibitions before rejecting the argument on the narrow
ground that the Opinions had not come into effect when the contract was
made.
These exhortations are remarkable because they signify the readiness
of the Court to invoke the Opinions beyond the calls of necessity, and to
pronounce its view about the effect of the Opinions on such contracts in
the future. In doing so, the Court blurred the line between judicial
adjudication of private law disputes and regulation, and extended the
reach of the latter into the private law realm. This is because another
paragraph, namely Article 52(5) of the Contract Law, provides that a
contract that violates the compulsory provisions of laws or administrative
regulations is invalid.78 The Opinions, being issued as a notice to the
financial institutions, do not fall into either of these two categories.
However, by invoking them to meet the broad criterion of concealment of
illegal goals under Article 52(3), the Court has elevated the legal status of
the Opinions through the backdoor.
4. Summary
To recapitulate the discussion so far, there has been rampant abuse of
the business trust in China by banks, provincial governments and stateowned enterprises to sidestep regulatory constraints on lending and
borrowing. This is possible because in reality, business trusts provide the
legal façade for operating fixed-income products backed by implicit
guarantee and masquerading off-balance sheet loans in the shadow
economy. At the micro-level, investors’ private law rights under a trust
are put in abeyance; at the macro-level, the business trust contributes to
the overheating economy and the time bomb of a financial crisis is ticking
away. Regulatory clampdown with tougher rules and enforcement came
in 2018, with the Supreme Court joining in the concerted efforts to bolster

Trust Co Ltd] (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 393, June 29, 2018 (China); Ziguan Xingui Beijing Beida
Gaokeji Chanye Touzi Gongsi, Guangda Xinglong Xintuo Youxian Zeren Gongsi Jiekuan Hetong Jiufen
(资管新规北京北大高科技产业投资有限公司、光大兴陇信托有限责任公司借款合同纠纷)
[A
Loan Contract Dispute between Beijing Peking University Hi-Tech Industrial Investment Co Ltd and
Everbright Xinglong Trust Co Ltd (2015) Min Er Civil Case No. 401, June 29, 2018 (China).
78. Chinese Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 52(5).
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the regulatory decrees. However, a key answer to the current problems
has thus far been overlooked: it is to go back to the basics of the trust and
reinforce the private law rights protected by this institution, for only then
would the concept be immune from abuse and distortion.
IV. RETURNING THE TRUST TO ITS ORIGINAL ROOTS
A. Inherent Limitations of Regulation
After almost two decades since the promulgation of the Trust Law,
aberrations in trust practice have been tackled almost exclusively by
tightening regulation. However, proper trust practice has yet to take root
in China as trusts continue to be misused to provide financing outside of
state credit limits. There have been cycles of boom and bust that
coincided with the loosening and tightening of regulation. While the
abuse of trust for regulatory arbitrage can indeed be tackled by closing
regulatory loopholes, the source of the other problems mentioned in this
Article lies in the systemic distortion of the trust concept in China which
cannot be solved by regulation alone.
The use of trusts to operate high-yield loan services, the improper
selling of trust products to investors, and the practice of implicit guarantee
are all due, in great part, to the failure to adhere to the proper trust concept,
with the result that the original allocation of rights and risks in a trust that
has made it so successful has become dysfunctional. The proper solution
is to bring the Chinese trust in line with the core private law principles of
the trust.79 Regulation can only facilitate this process through
administrative or criminal sanctions. As the regulatory cycles in the past
two decades have shown, regulatory policy may be influenced by fiscal
and political considerations. Nor does regulation achieve the supposed
allocation of risks in a trust relationship, which is a matter for the courts
through allocating legal liability inter partes. Unfortunately, the
regulators’ administrative intervention in the Jinxin trust scandal has
robbed the courts of the golden opportunity to develop trust jurisprudence.
79. See also Liu Yan, supra note 58; Li Chen, Ziguan Chanpin Gangxing Duifu de Jianguan Jinlu
yu Sikao [Prospects and Thoughts on the Regulation of Implicit Guarantees on Asset Management
Products]
JINRONG
FAYUAN
[FINANCIAL
LAW
FORUM]
194,
203
(2018),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFDLASN2019&f
ilename=JRFY201802038&v=MjE4MjU3cWZaT2RtRnl6a1Y3cktMei9OZDdHNEg5bk1yWTlHYklS
OGVYMUx1eFlTN0RoMVQzcVRyV00xRnJDVVI= [https://perma.cc/C76G-SHCB]; Zhou Minjia,
Lun Xintuo Gangxing Duifu Falv Guizhi de Wanshan [Thoughts on Improving the Legal Regulations of
Implicit Guarantee in Trusts] 3 HEZUO JINGJI YU KEJI [COOPERATIVE ECONOMY AND SCIENCE] 188, 190
(2018),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&f
ilename=HZJJ201806081&v=MDM1ODZxZlpPZG1GeXprVkwzSUxUZkJaTEc0SDluTXFZOU5aWV
I4ZVgxTHV4WVM3RGgxVDNxVHJXTTFGckNVUjc= [https://perma.cc/ZAF5-EE3Q].
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By compelling the trust company to make out-of-court compensatory
payments, the regulators set a dangerous precedent. Worse still, as the
amount of these payments is set by considerations of expediency rather
than the legal entitlements of the investors (that is, a higher level of
compensation for smaller investors who are larger in number), private law
redress for breach of trust is further side-lined.
B. The Essential Core of the Trust
It is time the core features of the trust took root in Chinese private law.
The past two decades have exposed the inadequacy of the Trust Law, and
the need for its broad provisions to be rendered into concrete operating
principles for a jurisdiction that does not previously have the concept of
a trust. This can be achieved by amendment of the Law itself, or as often
happens in China, the promulgation of a Judicial Interpretation of the
Trust Law by the Supreme Court. Between the two methods, there is
more scope for the Judicial Interpretation to flesh out the operating
principles for direct application by the courts.
Aberrations of the business trust practice that could have been avoided
by observing the core features of the trust abound. The payment of
bailouts from pooled assets was a direct infringement of the ring-fencing
of the trust property and the trustee’s duty to provide accounts on demand.
Similarly, in retaining profits from the investment of trust funds and
giving investors fixed interest payments, trust companies breached the noprofit rule and ignored the important principle that profits and losses
arising from the trust property were attributed to the beneficiaries.
Finally, the prevalence of bailouts shows that private law reliefs for
breaches of trust were simply cast to the wayside. A closer examination
of these features is in order.
Three of these core features, namely the ring-fencing of trust property,
the attribution of profits and losses to the beneficiary, and the trustee’s
duty to provide accounts, can be considered together because they pertain
to the proprietary effect of the trust relationship, which has been underappreciated in China. For example, a vast amount of official literature
and commentaries depict the trust in a saying that does not clearly
distinguish a trust from an agency. The saying describes the trust as a
legal relationship whereby, “having received a mandate, one manages
property for another” (shouren zhituo, dairen licai).80 It captures the
80. See, for example, Jianchi Shouren Zhituo Dairen Licai de Fazhan Fangxiang [Insisting on the
Development Direction of Receiving a Mandate and Managing Property for Another], ZHENG QUAN SHI
BAO
[SECURITIES
TIMES],
http://trust.jrj.com.cn/2008/11/0708442632450.shtml
[https://perma.cc/7XXH-X2A4]; Ji Hong, Shouren Zhituo Dairen Licai Xintuo Ye Jianjie [Receiving a
Mandate and Managing Property for Another – A Brief Survey of the Trust Industry] 3 SHIJIE ZHISHI
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representative nature of the trust relationship, but fails to accentuate two
important aspects. First, the trustee’s mandate is granted in virtue of his
power to administer the property as if he were the owner. Second, the trust
relationship is not merely about the trustee’s managerial service, rather it
creates a segregated and fluctuating fund in relation to which the
beneficiary has enforceable rights.
It is precisely the failure of the trust companies to observe this latter
feature that renders CITs trusts in name only. With the benefit of
hindsight, although the Trust Law lays down the principle of segregation
of trust property in Article 16,81 it does not set forth concrete operating
rules to give real teeth to this principle. For example, Articles 20, 33 and
49 give the beneficiaries the right to inspect trust accounts, but limit this
right to the receipt of an annual report. For trust products that involve a
short maturity period, some as short as one year, this right is illusory. It
is disappointing that despite the recent tightening of regulation, this
important issue is dealt with by industry guidelines issued by the China
Trustee Association, which only provides that a trust company shall
provide an account on a regular basis as agreed in the trust document.82
Given the unequal bargaining power between trust companies and
investors, the stipulation is unlikely to have any real impact. A better
approach is to recognize the right of the beneficiary to demand an account
on reasonable notice. Equally, the Trust Law does not stipulate the
principle that losses arising from authorized dealings of trust property are
attributable to the beneficiary. Instead, this principle only forms part of
the mandatory statement on the disclosure of subscription, is only part of
the mandatory content of the statement, and only finds itself in the
disclosure provisions of the CIT Measures.83 It is hoped that these gaps
can be plugged in a future amendment of the Trust Law or Judicial
Interpretation of the Supreme Court.
Turning to the no-profit rule, the Trust Law is unclear as to its nature
and scope, thus allowing trust companies (and trustees generally) to
ignore the prohibition with impunity.84 Article 26 of the Law states that
[WORLD
AFFAIRS]
14
(1997),
http://new.big5.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFD9697&filenam
e=SJZS199703009&v=MDEwMTN5em1WTHZNTmlmUmZiS3hGOWJNckk5RmJZUjhlWDFMdXh
ZUzdEaDFUM3FUcldNMUZyQ1VSN3FmWk9kbUY= [https://perma.cc/32X2-2F26].
81. See Chinese Trust Law, supra note 1 , art. 16 (the trust property shall be segregated from the
trustee’s own property); article 18: claims and liabilities arising from different trust properties should not
be offset against each other; article 29: the trustee shall separate trust property from its own property and
the properties of different trusts for management and account-keeping purposes. Articles 16 and 29 are
reiterated in articles 3 and 29 of the Trust Companies Measures, supra note 7.
82. Guidelines on Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust Companies, supra note 16, art. 52.
83. CIT Measures, supra note 7, art. 11(3).
84. For a study of the basis of the fiduciary duty in China, see Jianbo Lou and Xuelian Jiang, Xinyi
Yiwu de Fali Yanjiu – Jianlun Dalu Faxi Guojia Xintuofa yu Qita Falv Xinyi Yiwu Guize de Hudong [A
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except when a trustee receives authorized remuneration, it shall not obtain
personal profits from the use of trust property.85 Under Article 35,
remuneration for the trustee may be authorized by express stipulation in
the trust contract or upon subsequent agreement. This invites the
argument that when a CIT contract stipulates a fixed rate of return for the
investors, it is authorizing the trust company to retain as remuneration any
profits it makes from the trust fund over and beyond the fixed rate of
return. On this view, the trust company owes no duty to account for these
profits.
The scope of Article 26 is also limited. It states the no-profit rule, but
not the no-conflict rule, which has a distinct scope of its own. Besides,
the article prohibits the making of profits from the use of trust property,
but leaves open profits arising from the use of the trustee’s position.
These gaps are now expressly addressed in the Trust Companies
Measures, where breaches are remedied by administrative sanctions such
as confiscation of unlawful profits or administrative fines.86 Such awards,
if indeed ordered, may provide greater deterrence than remedies.
However, their availability is subject to the initiative and discretion of the
regulators, who may be influenced by political considerations and state
policies.
Finally, the most underdeveloped aspect of the Chinese trust is its
remedial system. Remedies for breach of the no-profit rule provide an
immediate example, for there are significant gaps both in black-letter law
and judicial practice. In terms of black-letter law, Article 26 only
stipulates that personal profits obtained from the use of trust property will
accrue to the trust property.87 This limited provision leaves the
beneficiaries without remedy in two common scenarios: (1) where such
profits are dissipated without the fault of the trustee and hence no such
property for the beneficiaries to claim; and (2) where the trustee makes
profits from the use of his position as opposed to trust property. To claim
these profits, the beneficiaries will have to try their luck with arguments
based on general principles in Chinese private law.
Study on the Theory of Fiduciary Duty – with Commentary on the Interaction between the Fiduciary
Principles in Civil Law and Other Jurisdictions] 1 SHEHUI KEXUE [JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES] 102
(2017).
85. Remuneration can be authorized in advance in the trust contract or subsequently, and the level
of remuneration can be adjusted by the parties’ agreement: Chinese Trust Law, Article 34.
86. Trust Companies Measures, supra note 16, arts. 25, 34(1), 59. Article 31(7) of the Guidelines
on the Due Performance of Trustee Duties by Trust Companies, supra note 16, also prohibits the trust
company from ‘seeking illicit gains or conducting commercial bribes for itself’, but as industry guidelines,
they do not have the force of law or administrative regulation.
87. Cf, Trust Act, Law No. 108, of 2006, sec. 3, art. 40(3) (Japan),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=2476#en_ch3sc3at2
[https://perma.cc/EDN2-P7KH] (providing generally for restitution of profits obtained from a breach of
fiduciary duty).
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First, the beneficiary will have to characterise the gains as a loss of the
chance to make profits on the part of the trust property, and then bring a
compensatory claim under Article 22 of the Trust Law. But some gains
of the trustee cannot be treated as loss of trust property by any stretch of
imagination. For example, unauthorized profits made from investments
that are prohibited by the trust contract cannot be recast as profits that the
trust could have made. Second, the beneficiary may invoke Article 404
of the Chinese Contract Law, which stipulates that a mandatary agent
shall “hand over to the principal any property acquired in handling the
entrusted affairs.”88 Mandate is a type of agency in civil law jurisdictions
whereby the agent can act in its own name without having ownership of
the managed property. The beneficiary will have to contend that Article
404 is applicable because the trust contract is a species of contract.
However, this article is crafted with mandataries rather than trustees in
mind. In any event, the scope of the article is limited to the first scenario,
where the unauthorized profits are deemed as trust property and hence the
trustee is handling “entrusted affairs.” It does not offer any solution to
the second scenario. Before any amendment of the law takes place, one
can only count on judges to resolve these issues. Yet this is where the
least progress has been made in China.
In terms of judicial practice, administrative intervention and preference
for criminal sanction have thus far deprived the courts of the opportunity
to flesh out the implications of Articles 22 and 26.89 In the Jixin Trust,
for example, the trust company released the trust fund to the target
company without acquiring any shares; it also transpired that the trust
company was associated to the target company. This clearly amounted to
an unauthorised disposition of trust property and a breach of fiduciary
duty, which would entitle the beneficiary to rescind the disposition and
seek a court’s order for restitution of the invested amount or compensation
for loss from the trustee under Article 22.90 As compared to the
regulator’s order for bailout based on expediency (full recovery for small
investors—because they made up the majority of the protectors—and
90% recovery for large investors), judicial remedy would have been more
principled and would have provided the basis for developing a rational
88. See Contract Law, supra note 4, and see generally Ying Chieh Wu, Constructive Trusts in the
Civil Law Tradition, 12 J. OF EQUITY 320, 327 (2018).
89. Chief officers of Jinxin Trust were convicted for illegally taking in deposits from the public
under article 176 of the Chinese Criminal Law in Jingxin Xintuo Touzi Gufen Gongsi ji Heguipin Dengren
Feifa Xishou Gongzhong Cunkuan An (金新信托投资股份公司及何贵品等人非法吸收公众存款案)
[The Case of Illegally Taking in Deposits from the Public by Jinxin Trust Ltd and He Guiping & Ors]
(2006) Xinjiang Xing Er Criminal Case No. 55, July 18, 2006 (China).
90. Assuming that knowledge of the breach of trust was imputed to the target company, it would
also be liable for restitution of the trust amount and compensation for the loss, albeit it had become
unworthy to sue.
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system of trust principles in China.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2018, the regulatory clampdown following the Asset Management
Opinions caused convulsion in the trust industry. Cash assets under
management at these companies fell, but the decline was reversed
marginally in the first quarter of 2019.91 There are even suggestions that
regulation may loosen in response to the severe credit crunch that is
happening at a challenging time of the Chinese economy, because China
has become too dependent on shadow banking to shoulder the shock of a
drastic clean up.92 Furthermore, regulatory approaches are liable to the
influences of politics and fiscal policies. These remarks highlight the
dangers of relying solely on regulation to promote proper trust practice
and show the importance of developing the core principles of trust law.
It is only when a rational system of rights and remedies is developed in
the private law realm that the trust will be immune from distortion. This
Article has proposed a few clarifications or amendments of the Trust Law
that would assist this process. They include stipulations that: (1) both the
losses and gains made from the use of trust property are borne by the
beneficiary; (2) the beneficiary has the right to demand the trustee to
provide an account upon giving reasonable notice; (3) the trustee is also
prohibited from making unauthorized profits from the use of its position;
and (4) it is liable to account for any unauthorized profits made from the
use of trust property or its position as trustee. These propositions are
rudimentary to any common law jurisdictions, but precisely because they
have not been adhered to in China, the Chinese business trust has yet to
reap the full benefits of this legal tool.

91. See Main Business Data, supra note 9.
92. Anjani Trivedi, For China, Kicking a $9 Trillion Habit is Tough Work, BLOOMBERG (N.Y.)
(June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-25/china-s-reliance-on-shadowbanking-is-growing-not-shrinking [https://perma.cc/676S-XUCA].
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